This article embeds a principal-agent model within a market equilibrium model of contract and cash markets to analyze the impact of contracting on the spot market for hogs. The equilibrium model incorporates both quality differentiation in the contract market and an endogenously determined cash market price. For three types of contracting scenarios, market equilibrium conditions are derived, and results are presented for a numerical example. Contrary to some empirical results, our model shows that the increased supply of hogs under typical formula-price contracts can increase or decrease the cash market price, depending on the relative size of overall contract supplies.
Livestock contracting and other forms of vertical coordination can provide positive benefits by offering a mechanism to smooth production, share risk, and provide proper incentives for attainment of difficult-to-observe quality attributes (see, e.g., Lawrence, Schroeder, and Hayenga 2001; Hayenga et al. 2000; Martin 1997; Goodhue 2000; Tsoulouhas and Vukina 2001) . However, increased acquisitions under contracts, a phenomenon sometimes called captive supplies by beef industry observers, can also cause legitimate concern if adverse impacts arise from a thinning of the cash market (Hayenga et al. 2000) . For hogs, Hayenga et al. (2000) and Grimes, Plain, and Meyer (2004) report that the cash market volume is dropping sharply (as low as 14% of the market according to Grimes, Plain, and Meyer 2004) , and price reporting will become more problematic. The Hayenga et al. report also suggests that for the beef sector increased captive supplies and packer influence may lead to market price declines or outright price manipulation.
Empirical market analyses and other theoretical studies devoted to this issue show mixed results, with several concluding that the increasing use of contracting in meat packing Yanguo Wang is senior analyst with Discover Financial Services and Edward C. Jaenicke is assistant professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, Pennsylvania State University.
Comments from two anonymous reviewers were gratefully appreciated. Any remaining errors are the authors '. reduces spot market prices and makes cash prices more volatile. Some empirical analyses that investigate beef prices, for example, find that increased captive supplies or forward contracting can reduce the cash price (Elam 1992; Schroeder et al. 1993; Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder 1996) or increase price variability (Barkley and Schroeder 1996) .
1 Alternatively, others (e.g., Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder 1998) find ambiguous price effects due to shifts in both market supply and demand. Some theoretical studies (e.g., Xia and Sexton 2004) show that contracts with special features such as best-price, top-of-the market clauses reduce cash market prices, while others (e.g., Azzam 1998) find ambiguous results because captive-supply-induced shifts in market demand and supply are not explicitly modeled.
Most if not all of these studies concern the cattle rather than the hog industry. Moreover, these studies, which employ different empirical techniques, data, and model specifications, fall short of providing a definitive description of impacts of contracting on cash prices. Despite evidence to the contrary, none of them incorporate asymmetric information into their models, especially imperfectly observed quality differences in the spot market and contract market. For example, several studies summarized by Hayenga et al. (2000) report significant differences in hog quality sourced from contracts and cash market transactions. In addition, reflecting quality differentials, average contract prices are consistently higher than spot market prices (Hayenga et al. 2000; Buhr and Kunkel 1999; Grimes, Plain, and Meyer 2004) .
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Due to the fact that the above studies, in part, suggest that quality differentiation and asymmetric information are important in the hog market, especially the contract market, and because they suggest that captivesupply-induced shifts in the contract market can clearly impact market demand and supply in the spot market, it seems necessary to construct a structural model that accounts for both these aspects when analyzing the impact of contracting on the spot market for hogs. In this article, we account for quality differentiation in the contract market by modeling individual processor-producer relationships in a principal-agent framework that incorporates hog growers' endogenous choice of imperfectly observed quality. This choice, therefore, reflects a hidden action-or moral hazard-on the part of the grower. For three types of contracts, we derive the contract and spot market equilibrium conditions within a general equilibrium framework by aggregating individual demand and supply in each market. Buhr and Kunkel (2000) and Hayenga et al. (2000) summarize the types of marketing contracts available in the hog sector. While more than a half dozen contract types exist, this article focuses on three stylized types that offer substantial differences: fixed-price contracts, market-price contracts, and formula-price contracts with quality premiums.
2 Formula-price contracts (which account over 47% of all contract types) are based on market prices plus a price premium or discount. Some observers have argued that formula price contracts do not provide price protection, as they fluctuate along with the market price on which they are based. Grimes, Plain, and Meyer (2004) note that the reference price may be the spot price for hogs or a down-stream meat price. Fixedprice and market-price contracts are relatively self-explanatory. The market-price contracts 2 Since packer-fed supplies account for only a small portion of pork packers' procurement of hogs, they are excluded from this study. We also exclude cost-plus contracts with quality premiums because results from this contract scenario are similar to a scenario based on formula price contracts with quality premiums. modeled below are a simplified synthesis of the basic features of price-floor contracts and price-window contracts, which are used in the hog sector to set a minimum and perhaps a maximum price. When the market price falls above the ceiling or below the floor price, the packer and the producer generally split the difference between the two prices.
A number of potential problems may complicate the seemingly straightforward task of model building. After Helpman and Laffont (1975) , and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , an extensive literature now exists on the intricacies and problems associated with incorporating moral hazard and adverse selection into a general equilibrium setting (see, e.g., Prescott and Townsend 1984a, 1984b; Bisin and Gottardi 1999; Magill and Quinzii 2002; Bennardo and Chiappori 2003) .
3 Among the first to document the conditions required for general equilibrium existence and Pareto optimality in the asymmetric information setting, Prescott and Townsend (1984a, 1984b) , found that equilibrium conditions with good normative properties can indeed exist if one employs a number of nontrivial assumptions. 4 In developing the equilibrium model of hog contract and spot markets that follows, abstractions from real markets also rely on nontrivial assumptions. However, we intend only to find equilibrium outcomes and impacts rather than to identify the necessary conditions and assumptions for the equilibrium.
5
Our model-building task is also particularly sensitive to the standard dilemma of 3 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer who reminded us about the relevance of this important literature. 4 Magill and Quinziiy (2002, p. 153) suggest that the recent literature is varied, and that a classification of the literature is premature. However, they offer a number of key differences among papers in the general equilibrium framework. They say that papers differ by the nature of risk, by the modeling of uncertainty, by informational assumptions, by market structure, and by analytic focus.
5 Placed in the context of the Prescott and Townsend (1984a, 1984b) papers and the literature that follows, several assumptions in our article, listed next, play no small role in governing the equilibrium conditions. (a) Rather than adverse selection, we assume moral hazard, which is found to be less problematic according to Prescott and Townsend (1984a) . (b) We assume preferences are separable in effort rather than nonseparable, a condition that Bennardo and Chiappori find to be a partly responsible for nonexistence of equlibria. (c) Mindful of Bennardo and Chiapporti's finding of positive profits, we do not assume a zero-profit condition at equilibrium. (d) We implicitly assume that contracts are exclusive (in the sense that a growers do not augment one contract with another), with exclusivity being a key feature of Prescott and Townsend's model (and others) . (e) Contracts are assumed to be standardized, an assumption used in Bisin and Gottardi. (f ) Finally, we assume that growers' participation and incentive constraints hold over expected values of the quality indicator. This assumption is similar to Prescott and Townsend's application of lotteries to the incentive constraints to ensure convexity.
finding the appropriate balance between including specific industry features and making simplifying assumptions. Adding real-world complexity to principal-agent models and general equilibrium models increases the likelihood of the model having either no equilibrium solution or a solution that is analytically or computationally impractical. On the other hand, stylistic assumptions decrease the model's relevance while increasing the risk of internal inconsistencies. In the model that follows, we rely on a number simplifying assumptions: (a) we assume hog quality takes two forms, high quality and low quality, and it is imperfectly observable in the contract market; (b) in the cash market, we assume only average quality is observed, thereby creating a "lemons" problem; (c) we assume that uncertainty enters from the processing side of the market and we rely on rational expectations to solve for the market equilibrium; (d) we assume that processors can choose contracts terms that make hog growers indifferent between selling hogs on the cash and markets; and (e) for those growers who choose to contract, we assume that proportion of hogs sold under contract is fixed exogenously. While all of these assumptions create problems and dilemmas, we have found them necessary to embed a principal-agent model successfully within a general equilibrium setting and, within this setting, to allow for a grower's participation and incentive compatibility constraints to contain an endogenous equilibrium market price. Given these assumptions, our model shows that the increased quality premiums available to contract growers benefit growers both in the cash and contract market because of the ability of growers to sell in either. Because the two markets are linked, therefore, we find that the use of formula price contracts with quality premiums can lead to higher spot market prices, higher processor profits, and higher welfare for both contract and independent growers. These results are no doubt driven by the assumptions underlying our model, which we develop in the next section.
The Principal-Agent Model in General Equilibrium
The model developed below reflects a threestage decision process: In stage I, processors compete for producers to whom they offer contracts, and each voluntarily participating producer signs a contract with a processor. In stage II, each producer determines the quantity and quality of hogs to produce and deliver to the cash market. In stage III, when the cash market settles, each processor decides the quantity to purchase in the cash market, and both the contract and cash markets clear. While this timing clarifies how production decisions are related to market equilibrium, because the following model is based on rational expectations, all general-equilibrium variables are solved for simultaneously, with both producers and processors looking forward in an ex ante fashion. Kawai (1983a Kawai ( , 1983b provides good examples for the rational expectation framework, and Xia and Sexton (2004) provide a good starting reference for the market model.
There are N homogenous producers and M homogenous processors in this model of the pork sector, with M N. In the first stage, each producer decides whether to sign a contract or not. Suppose n j producers sign a contract with processor j. For simplicity, we assume n j is same for every processor j. Each contract producer i independently produces a quantity of hogs q c based on his short-run supply function, that is, marginal cost. Of that total, an exogenously determined fixed proportion, ␤ ∈ (0, 1), is sold under contract to a processor. 6 Thus, each processor j obtains Q j 1 = n j ␤q c hogs from the contract market, where the subscript 1 denotes the contract market. On the other hand, those producers who do not participate in the contract independently decide to produce a quantity q s , again based on the short-run supply function. Each processor converts procured hogs into a finished product according to a transformation function g = g(Q | z), where z denotes the quality of hogs procured and is observable to producers but not to processors. The transformation function is assumed to be concave in Q and z with 
The representation of quality in the structural model is an abstraction from the real world. In the hog market, industry experts suggest that quality comes in two forms: carcass quality (e.g., leanness) and meat quality (e.g., flavor, juiciness, and tenderness). The National Pork Board (2002, pp. 7-8) suggests that carcass quality is at least partially observable, but that advanced measuring systems for meat quality are not yet but soon may be available. In this model, we simplify this notion of quality by assuming that hog quality is one dimensional-reflecting both carcass and meat quality-and imperfectly observable. We further assume that processors can provide quality premiums for hogs purchased under contract by basing payment on a quality indicator, P. One interpretation of P is that it is an imperfect measurement of meat and carcass quality, presumably using new measurement technologies that are only available to hogs produced under contract; a second is that P reflects the market price of the finished product, and thereby also reflects meat and carcass quality. This second interpretation of P roughly corresponds to residual claimancy as characterized by because grower payment would depend on the downstream price. The first interpretation is more abstract and eliminates delicate issues of timing involved with residual claimancy contracts such as postsettlement bonus or penalty adjustments. The second interpretation, however, is useful because of the economic ease of interpreting the downstream meat price as an imperfect signal of hog quality.
8 More specifically, we assume that P is a random variable based on a PDF f (P | z) conditioned on quality and a corresponding CDF F(P | z) that satisfies firstorder stochastic dominance.
In the cash market, P is assumed to be unavailable and, hence, quality differences are not as precisely observed as in the contract market. To simplify the analysis, we assume that only average quality is observed in 7 This treatment of other processing costs, h(·) implies that the processor's cost function, not modeled, would be separable with regards to hogs other inputs such as labor and capital. It is similar to Sexton's (2000) and Zhang and Sexton's (2002) assumption that farm product is converted to finished product in fixed proportions. 8 Moreover, both Grimes, Plain, and Meyer and the USDA Market News Daily Direct Hog Report (USDA/AMS) suggest that hog market formula contracts can be based on meat prices. An anonymous reviewer similarly notes that formula contracts are moving to a wholesale or meat-based price and that, for example, the hog futures price is a meat price. the cash market. Therefore, Akerlof's (1970) lemons argument applies and cash market prices would not provide sufficient incentives for hog producers to produce highquality hogs.
9 Hence, following this argument, we assume that independent producers not participating in contractual relationships will produce only low-quality hogs {z }, while contract producers (who also sell some hogs in the cash market) will produce either high-or lowquality hogs depending on the individual contract. More specifically, contracts that do not allow for quality premiums cannot be expected to induce high-quality hogs {z}. On the other hand, when contracts do allow for quality premiums, we assume that processors will attempt to induce high-quality hogs from contract producers. (Otherwise, processors could more easily use contracts without quality premiums if they wanted to induce low-quality hogs.) The contractual price, if they contain quality premiums, is therefore based on the quality indicator P, and we define it accordingly as w(P). For simplicity, we specify that the quality of hogs available in the cash market is the arithmetic mean of hog qualities sold by contract and independent producers to the spot market.
10
To simplify the analysis further, we assume that the transformation function of each processor is a linear function g(Q t | z) = ␣ z Q t with ␣ z < ␣z indicating the fact that high-quality hogs yield more finished product than lowquality hogs. Each packer incurs other separable processing costs which take a quadratic
2 , where t is a serially uncorrelated normally distributed random variable with mean zero and variance 2 . 11 Readers will note the subscript t in the output and cost functions, and later in other model terms. These subscripts reflect issues associated with timing of contract decisions, production resolution, and market clearing. For example, contracting and production decisions occur at time t − 1, whereas market clearance takes place at time t. The dynamic structure of this model is similar to the rational expectation model used by Kawai (1983a Kawai ( , 1983b . Finally, it is assumed that ␥z < ␥ z , reflecting the fact that low-quality hogs incur higher processing costs than high-quality hogs.
Contract producers have a time-invariant utility function u(W ) − v(z, q c ), where W = ␤w(P)q c + (1 − ␤) p s t q c represents the total revenue of each contract-participating producer from both the contract market and the cash market, and p s t is the spot market price at time t. However, for independent producers, total revenue comes only from the spot market; that is, W = p s t q s . Additionally, it is assumed that u is concave in W with u (W ) > 0 and u (W ) < 0. Producers' utility functions are assumed to have the property of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), u(W ) = 1 − exp(−r W ), where r is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Finally, each contract producer incurs total cost or disutility according to the function v(z,
c with c z < cz when z can take two forms representing low-quality hogs and highquality hogs. Thus, a contract producer choosing high-quality hogs incurs higher disutility. Under these assumptions, the expected util-
Given the above assumptions, each processor maximizes its net profit:
(1) subject to: The individual rationality constraint (2) requires that the expected payoff to each participating contract producer should be no less than that when he sells all his hogs to the cash market. The incentive compatibility constraint (3), which also contains the endogenous cash price, ensures that under the compensation schedule w(P) the producer's optimal quality choice is z. Equations (1)- (3) represent a fairly standard principal-agent contracting problem where the binary choice of unobservable quality replaces the standard choice of unobservable effort (see, e.g., Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green 1995). One major difference with the standard model is the inclusion of the endogenously determined spot market price in the two constraints.
Given the above set-up of the optimization problem, the processor chooses three variables, contract price (w), the spot market demand (q j 2 ), and the number of producers to sign a contract (n j ). Three important variables, however, are not choice variables: (a) q c and q s are determined by a short-run supply function by setting expected unit revenue equal to marginal cost, (b) the proportion ␤ of hogs sold by contract producers to each processor is fixed (though subject to a sensitivity analysis later), and (c) hog quality, z andz, is not explicitly chosen by the processor. Quality is instead chosen by producers and, for contracts with quality premiums, processors are assumed to implement contracts that can induce growers to produce high-quality hogs. Therefore, an individual processor can adjust its demand from both the spot market and the contract market by optimally choosing q j 2 and n j . The market equilibrium then requires that aggregated supply equals aggregated demand in both the contract market and the cash market. We assume that the contract market supply is perfectly elastic; therefore, we only need to solve the equilibrium spot market price. Specifically, market-clearing in the spot market requires the following condition:
Within this equilibrium setting, three separate cases are analyzed: (a) In case one, the processor optimally offers the producer a fixed price w(P) = w independent of P. (b) In case two, the contract price is set equal to the spot market price, that is, w(P) = p s t . (c) In case three, which examines a formula-price contract with a quality premium, we assume the contract takes a linear form in terms of the imperfect quality indicator, P, that is, w(P) = p s t + a + bP. These three cases are essentially solved the same way: In each case, equilibrium conditions must establish ex ante incentives meant to induce an ex post efficient outcome. However, the ex ante incentives are restricted in the sense that they depend on ex post equilibrium prices and quantities. The overall market equilibrium, therefore, is solved for simultaneously with the principal-agent equilibrium. In terms of the set up and solution methods, the only differences among the three cases are the form of the payment w(P). Because of these similarities, the solution for only one case, case (c), is described below.
12 Keep in mind, however, that the lemons assumption drives the intermediate results that a fixedprice contract or a market-price contract can induce producers to produce only low-quality hogs, while formula-price contracts with quality premiums can induce high-quality hogs from contract-participating producers.
Market Conditions for Formula-Price Contracts with Quality Premium
In this case and others, we assume independent growers will produce only low-quality hogs. Alternatively, given optimally chosen terms in the formula-price contract, we expect processors can induce contract growers to produce high-quality hogs. Contract growers will then send a proportion (1 − ␤) of these high-quality hogs to the cash market. In solving for the equilibrium conditions in this case, however, we assume the average quality of hogs in the cash market will be a straight arithmetic average of high quality and low quality: specifically,z = (z + z )/2. Additionally, we assume the marginal product of finished hogs acquired from the spot market is ␣z = (␣z + ␣ z )/2. However, producers who sign a formula-price contract with price premium will produce highquality hogs only. Separable labor costs for a processor still takes the form h(
2 /2 with ␥z < ␥z ≤ ␥ z , where ␥z is defined by ␥z = (␥z + ␥ z )/2.
Given these assumptions, each processor maximizes its net profit subject to each producer's participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint. That is,
Before deriving the first-order conditions, the endogenous contract parameters {a, b} can be derived from the two constraints. First, conditions (6) and (7) must be binding because, otherwise, the processor can always reduce the price offered to growers until both of the constraints become equalities. For each realized P, each producer's gross revenue, is W(P):
and 
Similarly, condition (7) becomes
The parameters {a, b} in the contract price can be computed by the conditions (8) and (9):
where P¯zand P z represent the expectations of P conditional on the choice ofzor z . In expression (11), one sees that the quality bonus rate, b, increases when disutility spread of choosing high-over low-quality hogs increases; alternatively, a lower bonus is associated with a larger spread in the quality indicators. These findings are consistent with what the informativeness principle (Holmström 1979) says about the marginal cost of effort and the precision of the (quality) indicator. Substituting (10) and (11) into the price specification, w(P) = p s t + a + bP, yields the contract price:
Given the contract price, producers' total cost function, v(·), and the associated marginal cost, each independent producer produces a quantity according to his short-run supply function, thereby satisfying the following condition:
Similarly, contract producers choose to produce
Hence,
These conditions imply that while quantities produced by contract and independent producers depend positively on the expected spot price, the contract quantity also depends negatively on the quality-induced differences in marginal disutility. Letting A = 
With the first-order optimality conditions to problem (5) now ready to be derived, we start by first noting that the optimal quantity of hogs demanded from the spot market, q j 2t , must satisfy
The first right-hand side term in (15) is the processor's marginal profit from one unit of hogs. As this marginal profit increases, that is, as the downstream-upstream expected price spread (after appropriate adjustments) increases, more hogs will be demanded from the spot market.
Also, the number of producers that each processor contracts with, n j , must satisfy
As above, the number of producers under contract increases with the adjusted downstream-upstream expected price spread, but decreases with the processing cost shock. The number of producers under contract also decreases as the quantity of hogs supplied by individual contract producers increases.
The spot market price can now be obtained by setting market demand equal to market supply in the spot market. That is, when Q 2s = Q 2d ,
Substituting the conditions (13)- (16) and taking the expectation operator E t−1 on both sides (applying the assumption E t−1 t = 0), we can derive the expected spot market price:
Substituting (18) back into (17) solves the spot market price:
Hence, the variance of the spot market price can be computed as 
, and substituting (19) into (15) yields the quantity of hogs demanded from the spot market by each processor:
Similarly, substituting (10), (11), (14), and (19) into (16) yields the number of producers with which each processor signs a contract: With model parameters showing up repeatedly in the above expressions, the intuition underlying these equilibrium conditions is far from straightforward. For that reason, a numerical example is used to investigate impacts of varying ␤ and other model parameters. Before conducting the numerical analysis, note that one can derive the spot price, the contract supply, the cash-market supply, processor profits, and producer welfare for the other three contact scenarios mentioned above in a similar fashion to the above derivation.
A Numerical Example and Market Performance Results
For each of the three contract scenarios, a numerical example shows how the various contracts and changes in the exogenous variable, ␤, affect contract supply, the spot market price, and producers' and processors' welfare. To start, we assume that the randomness associated with the quality indicator, P, is governed by a normal distribution function, with E(P | z) = z. For the numerical example, the values of parameters {␤, ␣z, ␣ z , ␥z, ␥ z , cz, c z ,z,z, r,M, N , 2 } are listed in table 1. Given these parameter values, table 2 shows the resulting equilibrium expected prices and quantities from the numerical example where ␤ is varied from 0.6 to 0.95 for the three contracting scenarios-a fixed-price contract, a market-price contract, and a formula-price contract with quality premiums.
13
Before we examine results for individual contract scenarios in detail, several general observations pertain to table 2 results. First, for each level of ␤ within each contract scenario, we note that contract and independent growers are equally well off (i.e., u 1 = u 2 ) because of the binding participation constraint. Second, for market price contracts, the expected spot market price, E t−1 p s t , does not vary with ␤ because processors are indifferent between the cash and contract markets and, as a result, there is no supply or demand pressure in this scenario. This logic is demonstrated in table 2's results, where, for market price contracts, processor profits, contract supply, spot market supply are all invariant as ␤ changes. Third, the expected spot market price, E t−1 p s t , is highest for formula-price contract scenario because its contractual incentives for quality spillover to higher average quality in the spot market, and translate into a higher expected spot price. Packer profits are highest for the formula-price contract scenario; moreover, profits increase as ␤ increases. This result suggests that if one could endogenize ␤, packers could design contracts that lead to extremely high captive supplies, thereby thinning the market even further. By fixing ␤, our model requires the number of growers under contract, n 1 , to adjust, decreasing as ␤ increases in order to keep spot market supply relatively stable. Finally, both contract and independent growers fare better with formula price contracts because, as stated above, the quality incentives lead to higher producer prices. Most of these general results, plus others, are 13 Results were also calculated but are not presented for cases where N = 20 and 100, and for cases where the risk aversion parameter, r, ranged from 0.1 to 2. The results for varied values of r and N are very similar to those in figure 1 , which demonstrates that, by varying ␤, contract supplies have a positive relationship with the expected spot market prices and the variance of the spot market prices. This result suggests that as ␤ increases, processors have the incentive to raise the contract price to make risk-averse producers indifferent between signing a contract and selling to the spot market. Increases in the contract price reduce the quantity demanded by each processor from the contract market and, hence, raise the quantity supplied to the spot market. Consequently, the quantity supplied to the spot market exceeds the quantity demanded from the spot market and the expected spot market price decreases.
Case (b), market-price contracts: Here, contract supplies through the market-price contract do not affect the expected spot market price or its variance. Under the market-price contract, a contract producer is indifferent both ex ante and ex post between signing a contract and selling to the spot market, and strictly prefers to produce low-quality hogs regardless of the parameter ␤. Hence, given any value of ␤, a processor optimally purchases half of her hogs from the contract market and half from the spot market under expectation.
Case (c), formula-price contracts with premiums: Under this scenario, table 2 results and figure 2 show that the relationship between contract supplies and the expected spot price takes a nonlinear form, with the spot price increasing and then decreasing as contract supplies increase. Furthermore, contract supplies are negatively related to the variance of spot market prices under the formula-price contract. These effects highlight the link between market equilibrium and the model's participation and incentive-compatibility constraints. Specifically, when ␤ is low and contract supply is small, increases in quantity demanded by processors raise the spot market price and, hence, the contract price. However, when ␤ and the contract supply becomes large, processors depress the contract prices further to make the market clear. This result is at odds with some empirical studies of the cattle market. Notes: "No change" indicates that contract supplies have no effect on the variable listed in the column heading. "Positive" indicates that contract supplies have a positive relationship with that variable; "negative" indicates a negative relationship; and nonlinear implies the relationship can at times be positive or negative.
The order (ranking) is based on the relative magnitude of variable listed in the column heading. The shaded boxes reflect the most preferred ranking. From table 2, one can also see that the expected market price under formula-price contracts is greater than those under the fixedprice or market-price contracts due to quality differences between the contract market and the cash market. Moreover, the formula-price contract causes the smallest variability of spot market prices among all types of contracts. Another important property of this contract is that it makes the spot market thinner, on a percentage basis, than the fixed-price contract and the market-price contract. Given the example shown in table 2, spot market supply accounts for about 46.75%, on average, of total supply; whereas, in the fixed-price and market-price contract scenarios, spot market supply accounts for 48.6% or 50% of total supply. Therefore, the additional market thinning due to the formula-price contract is largely consistent with what has been observed in the hog and beef markets. Welfare effects tend to highlight the tradeoff between risk and returns. For case (a)-fixed-price contracts, figure 3 shows that an increase in ␤ and then contract supplies raises both processors' expected profit and the variance of processors' profit. As each contract producer signs a greater proportion of his hogs with a processor, total contract supply slightly decreases and both contract producers and independent producers obtain a smaller expected utility. Furthermore, because processors can depress the contract price as producers' degree of risk aversion increases, processors capture relatively more surplus. In addition, increases in contract supply raise the variance of producers' income. However, because the contract price is fixed given each r and ␤, contract producers face a smaller variance of income than independent producers. Figure 4 shows these impacts of contract supplies on both contract producers' and independent producers' profit.
Q3
Under the market-price contract-case (b), changes in ␤ do not affect the amount of contract supplies, processors' profit, and producers' profit. As ␤ increases, the variance of both contract producers' and independent producers' income stays constant. Figure 5 shows that, for formula-price contracts with quality premiums-case (c), both processors' expected profit and variance of processors' profit increase as ␤ and contract supplies increase. On the other hand, figure 6 shows that contract supply is positively related to variance of producers' income and has a nonlinear relationship with producers' expected utility. Compared with independent producers, contract producers face a smaller variance of their income. Because processors can acquire high-quality hogs from the contract market, they earn a greater profit than that under the fixed-price contract and the market price contract due to greater profitability of high-quality hogs. Similarly, although producers incur high production costs from providing high-quality hogs to the market, both contract and independent producers can obtain a greater utility from high spot market prices. Risk-averse producers also benefit from low variance of spot market prices.
While imperfect competition is not explicitly modeled, one can get sense of how industry concentration would affect welfare measures by varying N/M, the ratio between the number of producers and the number of processors. For each value of ␤ under each type of contract, the expected spot market price is pushed down as N/M increases. However, the variance of spot market price stays unchanged. As a result, processors purchase more hogs from both the contract and spot markets due to the lower prices and, hence, both the contract and spot markets expand. Under each type of contract, processors obtain a greater profit as N/M increases. However, each processor incurs a greater variance of profit under each contract as N/M increases. Each producer, on the other hand, earns a smaller expected utility due to the reduced spot market price and the reduced amount of hogs produced by each producer. Each producer faces a smaller variance of income as well.
Conclusion and Discussion
For three stylized contract scenarios reflecting a range of hog contract types, we analytically solve for equilibrium outcomes are numerically find impacts from increased contracting. The main findings from the struc-
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tural model and the numerical example are summarized in table 3. At least two main results differ from those of previous studies: First, the article finds that for formula-price contracts increased contract supplies are negatively related to the expected spot market price when participating producers contract high proportions (greater than 0.8) of their hogs, but are positively related when producers contract lower proportions (between 0.6 and 0.8). Moreover, increased contract supplies reduce the variance of spot market price under formula-price contracts. Second, the article finds that the formula-price contract offers the highest expected profit to processors and highest expected utility to producers. These two results have direct bearing on reported complaints about contracts not providing price protection: Our stylized model shows that contracting can increase or decrease the spot price depending on the relative magnitude of contract supply, and can increase or decrease the spot price variance depending on the type of contract. More generally, both processors and producers prefer the formula-price contract to the fixed-price or market-price contacts if asymmetric information about hog quality is taken into account. Compared to other contracts, formula-price contracts offer processors greater expected profit and producers greater expected utility. These results are consistent with current observations that formula-price contracts are dominant in the hog sector.
The above findings are, of course, limited by the model's underlying assumptions, a number of which directly lead to the model's equilibrium conditions. First, assumptions imposed on product quality-in particular the lemons argument that independent producers will not produce high-quality hogs for the spot market and that only certain types of contracts can fully reward quality-have direct implications on the findings. Second, the assumption that contract producers' opportunity cost-or reservation utility-depends on the endogenously determined spot price forces the contract and cash market to be linked in a way that ensures contract producers must be just indifferent between producing in the two markets. Third, because we assume that uncertainty enters the market model in a very restrictive and simplistic way on the processing demand side of the market, the cash market remains valuable to processors. Fourth, because we assume that contract growers sell some proportion of similar quality hogs on the cash market, in some cases, our model results in increased contracting improving average hog quality in the spot market. And finally, the reliance on a predetermined proportion, ␤, of hogs sold by contract producers to the contract market is a very restrictive assumption that, among other things, guarantees that the spot market will not disappear even if contracts lead to very favorable equilibrium conditions. All these assumptions were made for practicality in solving for equilibrium conditions in a complex model. A possible next step in this research is to relax these assumptions and solve for equilibrium conditions entirely by numeric rather than analytic methods.
Given the direct role that our assumptions have on the results, the main value of this research comes not from the results themselves, but rather from a better understanding of how endogenous variables interact across the cash and contract markets. For example, as long as there is some uncertainty from the demand side of the hog market, then processors will find procurements from the cash market useful, despite the benefits of contracts. And given this usefulness, increased contract supplies place added demand pressure on the cash market, thereby increasing the cash price and the welfare of independent hog growers. This important linkage between the contract market and the cash market could, of course, disappear if real-world cash markets become too thin and disappear altogether. Policy makers and regulators, therefore, should continue to monitor the size of the cash market. A well functioning market enables independent growers to receive spillover benefits that originate in the contract market; a poorly functioning market might be improved with new public or private technologies aimed increasing the ease of measuring and observing hog quality.
In the future, our modeling results may be more insightful if less emphasis is placed on the analytic equilibrium outcomes and more emphasis is placed on numeric simulations. Freed from the burden of demonstrating the analytic solution, some restrictive assumptions can be relaxed and more real-world features can be added. One possible starting point for this type of modeling exercise is to add heterogeneity to growers and processors, and include more details about delivery timing of hog sales. These modeling additions would allow us to relate our theoretical hog market results to Schroeter and Azzam's (2003, 2004) recent empirical findings in the fed cattle sector. [Received February 2004; accepted February 2006.] 
